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abstract: British slaughter-house reformers campaigned to abolish private
urban slaughter-houses and establish public abattoirs in the nineteenth century.
Abolition of London’s private slaughter-houses was motivated by the congestion
created by livestock in city streets, the nuisance of slaughter-house refuse in
residential neighbourhoods and public health concerns about diseased meat in the
food supply. The butchers successfully defended their private slaughter-houses,
illustrating the persistence of the craftsman’s workshop and the importance of
laissez-faire sentiments in opposition to municipalization in Victorian London.
From 1828 until 1899, the slaughter-house reform movement campaigned
vigorously to abolish private slaughter-houses in London in favour of
public abattoirs. Private slaughter-houses were typically small facilities
that were owned and operated by independent butchers and located
behind or beneath a retail meat shop.1 Public abattoirs were large
municipally owned facilities that included a slaughter hall, a lairage to
house animals prior to slaughter, facilities for processing livestock by-
products and, by the turn of the century, refrigerated storage for fresh
meat.2 The public abattoir was a standard feature in many Western
∗ This articlewas researched andwrittenwhile Iwas on study leave granted by theUniversity
of Lethbridge and a visitor at the Centre of Canadian Studies, University of Edinburgh.
Mr Frederick Mallion and The Worshipful Company of Butchers of the City of London
kindly provided access to the Gunnar-Mallion Library at Butcher’s Hall, London. Rachel
Edwards and the many staff at the National Library of Scotland were unfailingly helpful,
while Rosemary Howard and Maxine Tedesco of the University of Lethbridge Library
assisted with UK sources. Diane Clark contributed helpful comments and two anonymous
reviewers made a number of useful suggestions.
1 F.J.T. Chater and H.F. Lester, Public and Private Slaughterhouses, report addressed to the
Society for Providing Sanitary andHumaneMethods of Killing Animals for Food (London,
1882); T. Orme Dudﬁeld, ‘Private slaughter-houses considered with reference to the report
of the Parliamentary Select Committee, 1873 on “noxious businesses”’, Society of Medical
Ofﬁcers of Health (London, 1874), 4–5.
2 G.R. Leighton and L.M. Douglas, The Meat Industry and Meat Inspection, vol. II (London,
1910), ch. 3; G. Leighton, Principles and Practice of Meat Inspection (Edinburgh, 1927);
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European cities and British slaughter-house reformers aspired to emulate
the continental model.
The goal of this article is to understand the persistence of private
slaughter-houses in nineteenth-century London, to assess the outcomes of
the slaughter-house reform movement and to explain why its opponents
were so successful. Two themes ﬂow through the article: the tension
between the laissez-faire economic values of the nineteenth century
and public ownership of meat processing facilities and the challenge
of regulating meat production in urban economies where inspection
procedures could be easily avoided.
London is the focus of the article because in no other British city were
public abattoirs advocated from such a diversity of sources and in no
other city of any size were they so decisively defeated. As a sprawling
metropolis and the world’s largest urban area, metropolitan London grew
rapidly in the nineteenth century, doubling in population between 1801
and 1841 to reach 2.3million by 1850.3 Annual meat consumption in
London increased from 70 pounds per capita in 1750 to 122–53 pounds per
capita by 1850.4 In 1842, only three years after the arrival of the ﬁrst railway,
London’s Smithﬁeld Market had sales of 175,000 cattle and 1.4million
sheep, virtually all for slaughter and consumption in the metropolitan
region. Considering that there was no direct rail service to the city’s single
central cattle market and that all livestock had to be driven through city
streets, the animal congestion on market days deﬁes the imagination.
George Dodd described Smithﬁeld as ‘savagely picturesque’ and as
domestic animals encroachedonpedestrian space, ‘the caldronof steaming
animalness overﬂowed from very fullness’.5 Cattle sales reached their
peak at Smithﬁeld in 1853 with 277,000 head of cattle sold while Chicago
received only 177,000 head in 1861 after 13 railroad lines converged to
make it the gateway to the American west.6 Writing in 1847, a liveryman
butcher claimed that London’s Smithﬁeld was not only the largest cattle
market in Great Britain or any other country7 but a public nuisance
of such proportion that it was a sign of London’s retrogression and
underdevelopment comparedwith contemporary cities. ‘Notwithstanding
our national aptitude for improving upon the institutions of other
P.A. Koolmees, J.R. Fisher and R. Perren, ‘The traditional responsibility of veterinarians
inmeat production andmeat inspection’, in F.J.M. Smulders (ed.),Veterinary Aspects of Meat
Production, Processing and Inspection (European Consortium for Continuing Education in
Advanced Meat Science and Technology, 1999), 18–19.
3 T. Chandler and G. Fox, 3000 Years of Urban Growth (New York, 1974), 328.
4 G. Dodd, The Food of London (London, 1856), 249–50. According to a more recent estimate,
British meat consumption per annum increased from an estimated 86.8 pounds per capita
in 1831–40 to 126 pounds per capita between 1910 and 1914, R. Perren The Meat Trade in
Britain 1840–1914 (London, 1978), 3.
5 Dodd, Food of London, 233, 244.
6 H.C.Hill, ‘The development ofChicago as a center of themeat packing industry’,Mississippi
Historical Review, 10 (1923), 261.
7 Liveryman of London, A Letter to the Right Honorable Viscount Morpeth, M.P. (London 1847),
5.
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countries, London is now inﬁnitely more behind the rest of the world
in this particular than she is before it in any other.’8 In the early years
of the railway age and prior to the advent of mechanical refrigeration,
London was coping with the greatest volume of food animals and carcase
meat of any city in history. No other urban area had ever handled such
large volumes of livestock in the heart of the city yet slaughtered them at
such a broadly dispersed spatial scale.9
In addressing the urban focus to public health concerns, Anne Hardy
points out that London had Britain’s ﬁrst extensive public health
organization while the great provincial towns lagged behind in the
appointment of medical ofﬁcers and the creation of public health
institutions.10 Yet in many of Britain’s provincial cities and towns private
sector slaughter had been banned in favour of public abattoirs owned
and operated by local government: Edinburgh’s municipal slaughter-
house was built in 1852, Manchester opened its public abattoir in 1872,
Birmingham’s dated from1895while Leeds had apublic abattoir by 1898.11
In the case of London, livestock slaughter was identiﬁed as a nuisance in
themid-eighteenth century and a systemof public abattoirswas advocated
as early as 1828. Yet private slaughter persisted well into the twentieth
century in London, dispersed through themetropolis in hundreds of small
private establishments.
Calls for slaughter-house reform originated from humanitarians, public
health advocates and residents suffering from the nuisance created by
livestock and slaughter activities. Slaughter-house reformers excoriated
butchers for cruelty to livestock andnegligent refuse disposalwhich added
to the teeming ﬁlth of the city.12 They advocated a system of inspected
8 Ibid., 8.
9 The next ﬁve largest cities in the world in 1850 after London were Peking, Paris, Canton,
Constantinople and Hangchow, see Chandler and Fox, 3000 Years, 328. Of those ﬁve,
only Paris had appreciable beef consumption and in that case markets were decentralized
around the suburban margin. London’s ﬁrst ranked position as a cattle market would
be short-lived as Chicago’s cattle handling capacity increased substantially with the
completion of the Union Stockyard in 1865 and the market for western cattle increased
very rapidly during the Civil War years, see W. Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and
the Great West (New York, 1991).
10 A. Hardy, ‘Pioneers in the Victorian provinces: veterinarians, public health and the urban
animal economy’, Urban History, 29 (2002), 372–3.
11 I. MacLachlan, ‘“The greatest and most offensive nuisance that ever disgraced the capital
of a kingdom”: the slaughterhouses and shambles of modern Edinburgh’, Review of
Scottish Culture, 17 (2004/05), 57–71; R. Scola, Feeding the Victorian City: The Food Supply
of Manchester, 1770–1870 (Manchester, 1992), 186–7; K. Grady, ‘The cattle and meat trades
in Leeds, 1780–1900’, Northern History, 37 (2000), 155; R.S. Ayling, Public Abattoirs: Their
Planning, Design, and Equipment (London, 1908), 58, 60.
12 For a selection of the slaughter-house reform pamphleteers see John Bull, An Enquiry into
the Present State of Smithﬁeld Cattle Market and the Dead Meat Markets of the Metropolis, 2nd
edn (London, 1848); T. Dunhill, ‘Sanitary evils from slaughter-houses in towns’, in Health
of Towns: A Selection from Papers on Sanitary Reform Published in the Journal of Public Health
and Other Periodicals (London, 1848); R.B. Grantham, A Treatise on Public Slaughter-Houses
Considered in Connection with the Sanitary Question (London, 1848); H.F. Lester, Behind the
Scenes in Slaughter-Houses, Humanitarian League’s Publications No. 5 (London, 1892);
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public abattoirs to meliorate and regulate a noxious urban land use and
prevent the spread of disease. Five separate reform initiatives can be
identiﬁed in nineteenth-century London: relocation of the Smithﬁeld cattle
market (1828–55), public health and urban sanitation (1834–55), exclusion
of noxious land uses frommetropolitan London (1844–74) and compulsory
meat inspection in the London County Council (LCC) region (1895–99).
Private slaughter-houses persisted in London because the butchers of
the metropolis were able to mobilize an alliance of urban meat and
cattle traders and rural agricultural interests in support of small-scale
independent meat shops. They staunchly defended the butcher’s private
property interests and his ‘right to slaughter his cattle upon his own
premises’.13 Butchers abhorred interference from humanitarian dilettantes
who besmirched the integrity of their craft. They saw themselves as honest
victims of a reform fad, heroic small traders whose dogged determination
and craft organization would prevail over a growing agro-industrial
monopoly and ofﬁcious interference from municipal bureaucrats and
public health authorities.14
It seems paradoxical that butchers, emblematic of Victorian London’s
growingmiddle class of shopkeepers andpetty capitalists,were embracing
liberalism’s commitment to property rights and laissez-faire economic
policy at the very same time that the need for urban reform and
government regulation was becoming increasingly apparent in the
nineteenth-century city. Yet public health legislation to deal with sanitary
problems such as livestock slaughter was generally permissive, reﬂecting
Victorian laissez-faire values about the role of local government vis-a`-vis
private property.15 Such a sceptical view of intervention by the state was
the prevailing sentiment of most members of the Poor LawCommission of
1832.16 But as the century advanced and public health reformers observed
and measured the sanitary conditions of British cities, a justiﬁcation for
the welfare state began to emerge in the context of local government.
Without sanitary legislation and local nuisance inspectors to enforce
it, butchers and the other offensive trades17 had no incentive to pursue
anything other than self-interest. ‘It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from
J. Oldﬁeld, The Evils of Butchery, Humanitarian League’s Publications No. 17 (London,
1895).
13 Parliamentary Papers (PP) 1847 VIII Select Committee on Smithﬁeld Market, Appendix
19, 398.
14 Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 155.
15 P. Lawless and F. Brown, Urban Growth and Change in Britain (London, 1986), 30.
16 J. Moore and R. Rodger, ‘Municipal knowledge and policy networks in British local
government, 1832–1914’, Yearbook of European Administrative Theory (2003), 33.
17 Offensive trades included occupations such as blood boiler, bone boiler, fellmonger,
slaughterer of livestock, soap boiler, tallow melter and tripe boiler, Statutes of the United
Kingdom, An Act for Promoting the Public Health, vol. 40, ch. 63 (London, 1849),
section 64.
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their regard to their own interest.’18 It was urban society that paid the
butcher’s bill through the negative externalities of private enterprises
such as the slaughter-house; the offensive nuisance and illness caused by
contaminated meat were the extra-market costs of operating a slaughter-
house which were paid by society as whole. Preventing these public
nuisances and health risks would be a ‘great good’, conforming to
John Stuart Mill’s dictum that ‘every departure from laissez-faire, unless
required by some great good, is a certain evil’.19 The tension between the
public abattoir question and the persistence of private slaughter-houses
spans the whole period in which Victorian cities were addressing the
question of government regulation by the local state and reﬂects its gradual
acceptance over the strident objections of the butcher trades.
Removal of Smithﬁeld Market
London’s Smithﬁeld cattlemarketwas established c. 950 outside the square
mile City of London. It was granted to the City by Charles I as a suburban
market site in 1638. By the mid-eighteenth century, Smithﬁeld Market was
no longer suburban as it had been enveloped by built-up urban land uses
as the city expanded.20 In 1766, John Gwynn complained that the sale
of live cattle at the centre of the metropolis was intolerable; Smithﬁeld
had become ‘a nuisance at once extremely dangerous as well as inelegant
and inconvenient’. With remarkable prescience, Gwynn went on to
propose the relocation of the cattle market to Islington, some two miles
to the north.21 Between 1800 and 1810, the City of London attempted
to enlarge Smithﬁeld Market to make it more functional and later to
relocate the facility to a more suitable site but the market’s opponents
and supporters stymied all efforts to resolve the problem.22
Britain’s inner city cattle markets and their closely associated slaughter-
house districts (or shambles) were widely deplored in the nineteenth
century23 but none was as large as Smithﬁeld, none attained Smithﬁeld’s
level of notoriety and none was the subject of so many inquiries on its
continued existence. Four separate parliamentary committees in 1828,
1847, 1849 and 1851 demonstrated a political division that would persist
to the twentieth century and prevent a deﬁnitive decision for many
years. Smithﬁeld andLondon’s slaughter-housedistricts became contested
18 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R.H. Campbell
and W.B. Todd (Oxford, 1976), 26–7.
19 J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, ed. W.J. Ashley (London, 1921), 950.
20 PP 1851 X Report from the Select Committee on Smithﬁeld Market Removal Bill, vi;
Liveryman of London, A Letter, 5; Grantham A Treatise, 70–1; Perren, Meat Trade in Britain,
32.
21 J. Gwynn, London and Westminister Improved, Illustrated by Plans (London, 1766), 18.
22 PP 1851 X Report from the Select Committee on Smithﬁeld Market Removal Bill, evidence
of E. Cardwell, 4; Dodd, Food of London, 250–1.
23 See for example, Scola, Feeding the Victorian City, 185; Grady, ‘Cattle and meat trades’, 146;
J.M. Eyler, Sir Arthur Newsholme and State Medicine, 1885–1935 (Cambridge, 1997), 64.
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Ill. 1: A mature cow, likely from one of London’s many dairies, sniffs at
a dead calf in Smithﬁeld Market, appealing to the sentimentality of the
Victorian age and causing us to wonder if it is hers. The butcher in his
two wheeled cart appears to be negotiating with a drover for two older
bull calves. The sewer grate is evidence of improved sanitation in the
market by mid-century.
Source: Illustrated London News, 15 (381), 21 Jul. 1849, 46. Reproduced by
kind permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland.
terrain. The commercial interests in favour of retaining the market in place
included the butchers, cattle dealers, meat traders and large-scale cattle
graziers as well as the ‘money-takers’, as Smithﬁeld’s commercial bankers
were known.24
In opposition to Smithﬁeld and private slaughter-houses was a diverse
group of professionals such as engineers and physicians with public
health interests, local residents and reformers who wanted to see the
market removed for humanitarian or sanitary reasons.25 Market opponents
complained of the market’s ﬁlth, congestion and the hazard posed to
pedestrians by driving cattle through the streets, cruelty in the driving and
handling of livestock and the sale of spoiled and diseasedmeat. Supported
by lurid articles such as ‘The Smithﬁeld nuisance’, which described how
people were trampled to death and gored by cattle herded through city
streets,26 the market’s opponents argued that a market for live cattle in
24 Liveryman of London, A Letter, 4; Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 36.
25 Hon. F. Byng, Smithﬁeld and Newgate Markets (London, 1851).
26 ‘The Smithﬁeld nuisance’, Illustrated London News, 10 (245) (1847), 23.
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the heart of a populous city was a dangerous nuisance and demanded its
abolition.27
Butchers and traders acknowledged that the market was congested and
conceded that this led to some cruelty.28 But in their view, the best solution
was to enlarge the market in situ and reorient trafﬁc arteries, maintaining
the essential market function in its established location. In 1828, a petition
from the Committee of Butchers of the Cities of London and Westminster
requesting market expansion was signed by 1,527 master butchers.29 As
an indication of their inﬂuence, Smithﬁeld was enlarged and improved
between 1835 and 1838 and again in 1846.
In 1828, two innovative proposals were made for the replacement of
Smithﬁeld Market by a suburban belt of cattle markets reminiscent of
the suburban abattoir plan developed on the periphery of Paris between
1810 and 1816.30 Providing evidence to the ﬁrst House of Commons
Committee struck to look into the Smithﬁeld Market problem, James
Mills, an engineer, advocated a system of four suburban public abattoirs
arranged in an oval six miles by four miles in extent. In the same year
an architect, James Hakewell, proposed to replace the one large market at
Smithﬁeldwith four smaller ones located inKilburn,Hackney,Wimbledon
and Blackheath, all with road access to the north and south. And imitating
the spatial division of the marketing function from the slaughter and
processing functions found in Paris, he proposed ten separate abattoirs
on metropolitan London’s periphery to avoid driving livestock through
city streets.31 These plans anticipated Dr Shirley Murphy’s 1898 plan for a
suburban ring of public slaughter facilities but found little support.
In an age before refrigeration, London relied on local butchers to store
meat on the hoof at their private slaughter-houses. This was especially
important in summer months when fresh meat would spoil quickly if had
to be transported over any distance. In June, fresh beef ormutton could not
27 A.B. Robertson, ‘The Smithﬁeld cattle market’, East London Papers, 4 (2) (1961), 81–2;
J. Lawrence, A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on Horses and the Moral Duties of Man
towards the Brute Creation (London, 1796), 155.
28 C.F. Green, A Few Plain Words on the Relative Merits of Smithﬁeld and Islington Markets
(London, 1897), 8.
29 Thoughdated 1828, the petitionwas not reported until 1847, PP 1847VIII Select Committee
on Smithﬁeld Market, Appendix 17, 396–7.
30 PP 1828VIII Select Committee on the State of SmithﬁeldMarket, evidence of J.Mills, 134–8;
further evidence on the abattoirs of Paris, 186, 252. For details of the Napoleonic abattoir
system of Paris see Ayling, Public Abattoirs, 69; J. Hakewell, Plan Sections, and Elevations of
the Abattoirs of Paris, with Considerations for their Adoption in London (London, 1828), 6–11.
31 Ten public slaughter-houses were proposed: four on the north side of London: Edgeware
Road, Tavistock Square on the edge of the New Road, Haberdasher’s Alms Houses near
the Great North Road and Bethnal Green; two in the north-east at Stepney between the
Mile End and Commercial Road and at Chelsea between the King’s and Putney Roads;
and four on the south side of London, between Westminster and Waterloo Bridges, in the
open square near the Obelisk, Bermondsey near the Kent Road, and between Rotherhithe
and Deptford, Hakewell, Plan Sections, 6.
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Ill. 2: While it could be typical of any market morning in the ﬁrst half of
the nineteenth century, this scene actually represents Smithﬁeld Market’s
last day of operation before it was relocated to Islington in June 1855.
Source: Illustrated London News, 26 (748), 16 Jun. 1855, 600. Reproduced
by kind permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland.
be transported more than 25 miles by road before spoilage set in.32 Thus
most meat entered London on the hoof. In 1828, the supply of livestock
at Smithﬁeld Market was estimated at ten times the equivalent volume of
meat that came indead.Cattle throughput at Smithﬁeld increasedby 34per
cent between 1828 and 1844 and congestion became especially problematic
in the autumn and early winter when livestock sales reached their annual
peak.33 Much of the growth in livestock throughput was accommodated
by the railways that began to penetrate the metropolis in the late 1830s.
Euston station became one of the largest cattle handling terminals yet was
some twomiles from Smithﬁeld by road. By 1849, 56 per cent of the 223,000
cattle arriving at Smithﬁeldwere shipped by rail and herded through busy
streets.34
In ﬁnally opting for removal in 1855, London’s continuing rapid
growth and the growing role played by railway transportation technology
were critical factors in the selection of a new central cattle market to
replace Smithﬁeld. The solution to the Smithﬁeld Market problem was a
32 PP 1828 VIII Select Committee on the State of Smithﬁeld Market, evidence of B. Stubbing,
112.
33 PP 1849 XIX Select Committee on Smithﬁeld Market, 51, evidence of T. Evans, q. 2326.
34 Dodd, Food of London, 242; F. Sheppard London: A History (Oxford, 1998), 265–7.
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Ill. 3: The Metropolitan Cattle Market, Islington, was opened in 1855 by
the Prince Consort to replace Smithﬁeld. Despite a location adjacent to
the Great Northern Railway, drovers were still driving ﬂocks and herds
through city streets.
Source: Illustrated London News, 26 (748), 16 Jun. 1855, 601. Reproduced
by kind permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland.
transport-oriented suburban location to minimize the distance that cattle
had to be driven through city streets to reach the market that kept large
concentrations of livestockwell away from congested inner city residential
areas. Over twomiles north of Smithﬁeld, the Metropolitan Cattle Market,
Islington, was immediately adjacent to both the North London Railway
cattle station and Great Northern Railway depot.35 Thus the removal and
relocation of the Smithﬁeld cattle market in 1855 was consistent with
the new model of urban livestock marketing that would be followed in
Chicago’s Union Stock Yards just ten years later on the ‘open prairie’ of
the town of Lake, south of Chicago’s city limits.36
The removal of Smithﬁeld Market was a reﬂection of the changing
structure of London’smeat supply.37 First, the proportion ofmeat supplied
on the hoof compared with the amount of meat from livestock that had
been killed elsewhere (country-killed) declined precipitously through the
century as retail butchers gradually came to depend on dead meat and
35 Dodd, Food of London, 261.
36 Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 69.
37 The site of Smithﬁeld Market lay vacant for 13 years after its closure in 1855. In 1868, the
London Central Markets facilities were built in its place and began to function as a dead
meat market, replacing the old Newgate Shambles. London Central Markets are still in
operation and referred to colloquially as Smithﬁeld; Robertson, ‘Smithﬁeld’, 87.
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slaughtered less livestock in their own slaughter-houses.38 By 1849, 75 per
cent of the meat sold at Newgate Market (the largest dead meat market in
the United Kingdom) was country-killed and only a quarter was derived
from livestock slaughtered in London and processed through Smithﬁeld.39
This shift reﬂected the advent of the railway; by 1855, sides and quarters
of beef were being shipped from as far away as Aberdeen.40 However, the
eighty-year delay in the relocation of Smithﬁeld after JohnGwynn had ﬁrst
elucidated its shortcomings was at least in part a measure of the political
inﬂuence and foot-dragging by the butchers.
Smithﬁeld and the butchers
London’s Worshipful Company of Butchers is among London’s oldest
livery companies with origins in the tenth century. As a guild, the
Butchers’ Company was the traditional representative and defender of
meat processing crafts in the City. But by the sixteenth century, the City’s
cattle and meat markets were being inﬁltrated by non-freemen (butchers
who had not formally apprenticed and had not been admitted as members
of the Company).41 Suburban butchers more than one mile from the
City were outside the guild’s jurisdiction and could safely ignore the
Company.42 By 1674, butchers were opening shops all over the City and it
was becomingmoredifﬁcult tomaintain recognizedmarkets and shambles
as exclusive localities under the guild’s jurisdiction.43 In 1726 and again in
1758, the Butchers’ Company petitioned unsuccessfully for its freemen to
have exclusive access to the market at certain times of the week.44
By the late eighteenth century, the traditional division of London’s
butchers into freemen of the Company and non-freemen was restructured
along functional lines into carcase butchers (slaughterers andwholesalers)
and cutting butchers (cutters and retailers).45 Carcase butchers were
typically freemen of the Company and viewed as a powerful force in
the Smithﬁeld cattle market. They bought large quantities of livestock on
the hoof, slaughtered cattle and sold carcases by the quarter or side to
38 PP 1828 VIII Select Committee on the State of Smithﬁeld Market, 112; evidence of B.
Stubbing, 113; Dodd, Food of London, 242, 265; Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 105.
39 Dodd, Food of London, 268, 275.
40 Ibid., 271; Robert Herbert ‘Arrangements for the supply of meat for themetropolis’, Journal
of the Royal Agricultural Society, 2nd ser. 2 (1866), 200–1; D. Rixson, The History of Meat
Trading (Nottingham, 2000), 314.
41 P.E. Jones, The Butchers of London (London, 1976), 89–90.
42 Ibid., 35.
43 Ibid., 95, 97.
44 Robertson, ‘Smithﬁeld’, 82; Jones, Butchers of London, 96–7.
45 The wholesale–retail segmentation of London’s nineteenth-century meat markets was
unique in Britain. In the provincial cities, the ‘do-all’, retail butcher appears to have been
dominant in all aspects of the trade from occasional cattle fattening, slaughter, carcase-
breaking and retailing to consumers. See J.B. Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850–1950
(Cambridge, 1954), 181; Scola, Feeding the Victorian City, 183–4.
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the cutting butchers. In some cases the carcase butchers had land of their
own thus they could purchase cattle direct from graziers and depending
on market conditions, could add value and fatten the beasts or slaughter
them for sale immediately. In 1680 for instance, Richard Hodgins, a former
Master of the Butchers’ Company, owned 77 cattle and 575 sheep, rented a
considerable area of marshland as pasture, sold livestock on commission
and employed agricultural labourers, drovers anddomestic staff. Thus had
a butcher become a fat stockmerchant of considerablemeans and inﬂuence
over meat prices.46 Indeed, the carcase butchers were widely accused of
forestalling and regrating: buying up cattle en route to the market and, in
league with large-scale graziers and salesmen, using their market position
to inﬂate meat prices.47
However, the power of the Butchers’ Company ebbed away during the
1840s and 1850s. Trade liberalization admitted large volumes of foreign
cattle over which the Company had little control, the metropolis was
expanding and its trade area for fresh meat extended far beyond the
City-based Butchers’ Company. The cutting or retail butchers operated
shops dispersed throughout the city and beyond and few were freemen
of the Company. While the cutting butchers bought most of their meat
at wholesale from carcase butchers, they did purchase some livestock
through livestock dealers for slaughter on their own account. The cutting
butchers were alleged to cause the greatest nuisance as they had to drive
their livestock through city streets to reach shops which were dispersed
all over the metropolis, their slaughter-house activities interfered with the
ﬂow of trafﬁc and they were known for dumping the ‘pudding’ or entrails
of slaughtered livestock in the streets and drainage channels.48
Just one year after the relocation of SmithﬁeldMarket theCity’s common
council passed an act removing the obligation to be ‘free’ in order to trade
meat in London in 1856.49 Shorn of its formal authority even in the City, the
Butchers’ Company exercised little inﬂuence over the public health and
sanitation issues that were to affect London’s meat industry in the latter
half of the nineteenth century. The relocation of SmithﬁeldMarket resolved
the congestion problem and shifted much of the public nuisance created
by the cattle market to a decentralized and less frequented venue; the
cutting butchers were spreading further aﬁeld, guarding their ﬂexibility
to slaughter animals in their own private slaughter-houses and exposing
larger numbers to slaughter-house wastes in the growing metropolis.
46 Jones, Butchers of London, 101.
47 Philanthropic Butcher, Monopoly. The Cutting Butchers Appeal to the Legislature, upon the
High Price of Meat (London, 1795), 10–12; Jones, Butchers of London, 103.
48 Dodd, Food of London, 229–31; Robertson, ‘Smithﬁeld’, 81–2; Gentleman of the Temple
Public Nusance [sic] Considered: Under the Several Heads of Bad Pavements, Butchers Infesting
the Streets, . . . (London, 1754), 13, 14, 22, 25.
49 Jones, Butchers of London, 105.
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Public health reform and the nuisance question
Just as the Smithﬁeld Market question was coming to a resolution, the
public health movement posed a new challenge to the private slaughter-
house. In 1840, the Select Committee on theHealth of Towns advocated the
relocation of animal slaughter to outlying suburban areas. Physicians such
as George S. Jenks recommended the construction of large-scale abattoirs
outside the urban area to promote good health and remove the slaughter-
houses with their ‘putrefying exhalations’ from densely built-up areas.50
According to a butcher liveryman:
The ﬁlth, garbage, and impurities of every description generally to be found in
slaughter-houses, in almost every stage of decomposition, contribute their quantum
of deadly exhalations to the atmosphere of the slaughter-house, and then, after
having impregnated the neighbourhoodwith offensive andunwholesome efﬂuvia,
are consigned to the sewers, by which they are ultimately conveyed to the Thames,
to increase the noxious exhalations from its banks, or, detained in their progress
through those notoriously defective channels, to breathe forth at every loophole
putrescence and disease!51
In the view of adherents of the miasma theory of disease, the
decomposition of slaughter-house waste posed a public health hazard.
Abolition of private slaughter in urban areas and the establishment of
suburban public abattoirs was justiﬁed to reduce exposure to the miasma.
Yet epidemiological observations did not always provide the support
required to justify abolition. In reporting on the causes of sickness and
mortality affecting the poor of London’s east end in 1838, Dr Southwood
Smith noted that the south side of Whitechapel High Street in the City
was occupied by butcher shops with slaughter-houses behind the street.
Typhoid fever had been mitigated when the Corporation provided a
common sewer to drain the slaughter-houses and surrounding dwellings.
Blood and efﬂuvium from the slaughter-houses were still ‘odoriferous’ but
fever was ‘comparatively absent’ after the opening of the drains.
Dwellings thickly crowdedwith inhabitants stand all around the slaughter-houses,
yet here, where the materials for the production of the worst forms of fever are
most abundant, scarcely a case has occurred, even during the present epidemic.
On the other hand, in the passages, courts, and alleys, on the very opposite side
of the street from the houses of which there are no drains into the common sewer,
fever of a fatal character has been exceedingly prevalent.52
While accumulations of animal waste in poorly drained areas were
‘odoriferous’, and according to the prevailing miasmatic theory of
pathogenesis embraced by Smith should have been sufﬁcient cause for
50 PP 1840 XI Select Committee on The Health of Towns, 165; evidence of George S. Jenks,
qq. 2792–3.
51 Liveryman of London, A Letter, 13.
52 PP 1838 XXVIII Fourth Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners for England and
Wales Supplement No. 2, Appendix A, 85–6.
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heightened morbidity,53 his own observations suggested that miasma
arising from animal slaughter was not an intrinsic health hazard.
Seventeen years later, John Snow, testifying as an opponent of the
miasmatic theory, would be at pains to argue that the foul odours
emanating from London’s offensive trades were not responsible for the
spread of epidemic diseases such as cholera. Snow argued: ‘a bad smell
cannot, simply because it is a bad smell, give rise to a speciﬁc disease, so an
offensive business conducted in a place where it ought not to be, should be
proceeded against by ordinary law as a nuisance,without applying to it the
word pestiferous, or otherwise dragging in and distorting the science of
medicine’.54 Some of the most inﬂuential physicians of the day, including
both proponents and opponents of the miasmatic paradigm, were unable
to present any evidence that slaughter-houses posed a hazard to human
health. The unseemly sights, sounds and smells of slaughtermaywell have
been obnoxious but theywere neither noxious nor implicit health hazards.
Chadwick’s 1842 Sanitary Report focusedmainly on insanitary drainage,
water supply and over-crowded housing, but it also observed that
slaughter-houses were found in the most populous areas and that they
constituted a ‘decided nuisance’ when they contributed offal and manure
to adjacent ‘dunghills’ which also included street sweepings and privy
excrement.55 Chadwick applied the nuisance concept at three different
conceptual scales: public, common and private nuisances.56 A public
nuisance affected the whole realm, a common nuisance affected all those
passing by while a private nuisance affected particular individuals. A
nuisance was an offence caused by an act, or a neglect to act, which the
common good requires. A private nuisance, unlike a public nuisance, was
not an innately illegal act or condition but acquired its obnoxious character
by virtue of its location relative to a dwelling or place of business. The
remedy to a private nuisance was civil action under common law while a
common or public nuisance was an indictable offence.57
The intendment of the nuisance concept was something harmful,
annoying or offensive forwhich therewas a legal remedy. In the eighteenth
century the ‘punishment and removal of nuisance’ was viewed as ‘one
of the greatest marks of liberty . . . and is so guarded by laws, that all
53 Southwood Smith along with Edwin Chadwick and all the other mid-nineteenth-century
sanitarianswere committed to themiasmatic theory of pathogenesis, S. Snow, ‘Sutherland,
Snowandwater: the transmission of cholera in the nineteenth century’, International Journal
of Epidemiology, 31 (2002), 909; A.S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain
(London, 1983), 87.
54 J. Snow quoted in D.E. Lillienfeld, ‘John Snow: the ﬁrst hired gun?’, American Journal of
Epidemiology, 152 (1) (2000), 8.
55 E. Chadwick, The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population, ed. M.W. Flinn (Edinburgh,
1965), 82.
56 M.W. Flinn, ‘Introduction’, in A.P. Stewart and E. Jenkins, The Medical and Legal Aspects of
Sanitary Reform, 2nd edn (1867; New York, 1969), 14; Chadwick, Sanitary Condition, 349.
57 Chadwick, Sanitary Condition, 349.
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the King’s authority cannot pardon a nuisance; it must be removed’.58
The nuisance posed by butchery was associated with offensive smells,
disagreeable carcase by-products in the streets, obstruction of the public
way by meat displayed for sale and the pedestrian hazard created by
driving cattle through the streets.59 But it was not until sanitarians such
as Edwin Chadwick became inﬂuential in the mid-nineteenth century that
a nuisance came to be viewed as a hazard to health. When Chadwick
used the term ‘nuisance’, he was typically referring to an accumulation of
decomposing refusewhichwas believed to be the ‘direct cause of disease’60
due to the miasma it created. In Chadwick’s words: ‘all smell is disease’.61
Chadwick’s Sanitary Report led to the State of Large Towns Commission
which found that common law was not very effective in dealing with
nuisances, providing the justiﬁcation for public health legislation. Under
common law, it was difﬁcult to establish the cause and effect relationship
required to show that a slaughter-house was a common nuisance. For
example, Dr Lyon Playfair’s report on the sanitary conditions in towns of
Lancashire observed large accumulations of animal waste that constituted
a nuisance yet therewere no powers in the Police Acts for their removal. To
support an indictment as a public nuisance, members of the public had to
testify that the stench of rotting offal and manure was a public annoyance.
Since the court leet62 met only twice a year, it was difﬁcult to arrange for
thosewho complained of the nuisance to attend court and caseswere often
dismissed for lack of evidence.
Hence if these slaughter-houses be in private courts, they are permitted to remain,
however injurious to the inhabitants, and in whatever state of ﬁlth they may be
kept . . . [T]he state of the law prevents any interference with the manner in which
slaughter-houses are conducted. True it is, that aggrieved parties may indict the
occupiers of the premises, but, being of the poorer class, they can neither afford
the time nor the money to pursue such indictment; nor indeed are they aware of
the pernicious effects arising from the presence of decomposing refuse.63
The State of Large Towns Commission recommended that many of the
strictly private nuisances which had prevailed in towns be declared as
public nuisances and subject to summary abatement. This would also
empower local administrative bodies to direct that legal proceedings be
taken for their suppression.64
58 Gentleman of the Temple, Public Nusance, 19–20.
59 Ibid., 21–3.
60 Chadwick, Sanitary Condition, 43.
61 PP 1846 X Metropolitan Sewage Committee Report, 651.
62 The court leet was an ancient institution that triedminor offences such as public nuisances
and was lowest in the hierarchy of English courts. Courts leet were abolished by the
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835; however London was exempted from the legislation.
R. Porter, London: A Social History (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 246.
63 PP 1845 XVII Second Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the State of Large Towns
and Populous Districts, Appendix Part II, 17, s. 43.
64 Ibid., 44.
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Accordingly, John Simon, medical ofﬁcer of health for the City of
London, argued that state action which interfered with private liberty
could be justiﬁed when a nuisance had a public impact. ‘The factory
chimney that eclipses the light of Heaven with unbroken clouds of smoke,
the melting house that nauseates an entire parish and the slaughter-house
that forms round itself a circle of dangerous disease – these surely are not
private, but public affairs.’65 Recognitionof public nuisances andproposals
for statutory redress mark the beginning of a new role for the state in civil
society, acknowledging that government regulation of urban nuisances
was warranted, and endorsing restrictions on the offensive trades in
London.
Restricting noxious businesses in the metropolis
The Towns Improvement Clauses Act of 1847 gave Britain’s local
authorities the power to make sanitary improvements and authorized
by-laws for licensing, registration and inspection of slaughter-houses.
However, the act did not apply inside the London metropolis.66 It was
not until 1855 that the Nuisances Removal Act gave local authorities
the power to order the removal of unhealthy or unsafe accumulations
of excrement, refuse and waste from slaughter-houses among other
businesspremises anddwellings.67 Bothof these actswere legislatedpolicy
responses to thepublic healthmovement and themiasmatic conviction that
slaughter-houses were not merely an offensive nuisance, their exhalations
constituted a health hazard.
But the most powerful legislative strike against London’s slaughter-
house nuisance came from another quarter. Slaughter-houses, and all the
other offensive trades, had been effectively banished from the London
metropolis four years previously.68 The Buildings Act of 1844 banned
slaughter-houses and many other noxious businesses within 50 feet of
any dwelling house and 40 feet of a public way. The effect of this
legislation would have been to eliminate virtually all private slaughter-
houses from the London metropolis,69 a more draconian measure than
65 J. Simon, ‘Report of the medical ofﬁcer of health’, Times (London), 10 Dec. 1851, 3.
66 PP 1904 XXIV Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Consider the
Humane Slaughtering of Animals, 21; Porter, London, 246.
67 Wohl, Endangered Lives, 153; B. Watkin Documents on Health and Social Services, 1834 to the
Present Day (London, 1975), 45.
68 The London metropolis was deﬁned broadly to include all places within the
exterior boundaries of the parishes of Fulham, Hammersmith, Kensington, Paddington,
Hampstead, Hornsey, Tottenham, St Pancras, Islington, Stoke Newington, Hackney,
Stratford-le-Bow, Bromley, Poplar, Shadwell and the north part of Chelsea on the north
side of the Thames and Woolwich, Charlton, Greenwich, Deptford, Lee, Lewisham,
Camberwell, Lambeth, Streatham, Toting and Wandsworth on the south bank. United
Kingdom, ‘An act for regulating the construction and the use of buildings in themetropolis
and its neighbourhood’, Statutes at Large, 7th and 8th Victoria, vol. 17 (1844), c. 84, s. 3.
69 PP 1873 X House of Commons Select Committee on Noxious Businesses, evidence of J.W.
Crouch, solicitor, 14. In 1902, it was determined that only 19 of the 381 slaughter-houses
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was possible under any previous public health legislation. By effectively
banning livestock slaughter within the metropolis, the act would have
enforced the suburbanization of a signiﬁcant food processing industry.
The butchers argued that this measure would destroy their businesses and
they received a 30 year grace period; the slaughter-house ban was not to
take effect until 1874.70 30 years’ notice provided ample opportunity for
cutting butchers to plan a gradual phase-out of their intra-urban slaughter
facilities.
However, the law was ostensibly forgotten for the next 29 years until,
in May 1873, less than a year before it was due to take effect, the law
was rediscovered to the apparent consternation of the butchers. A House
of Commons Select Committee on Noxious Businesses was struck as a
matter of some urgency to consider the clauses of the Buildings Act
which would have effectively banned all of the offensive trades from
the metropolis, most notably, slaughter-houses.71 Had the committee
supported the original legislation, the only alternative for London would
have been to build one or more public abattoirs in suburban locales. La
Villette, the grand new central abattoir in Paris, had been completed in
1867, only seven years previously, and was the European paradigm for
the sale and slaughter of livestock. ‘It became the abattoir, a prototype
for the rest of the century, just as the boulevards and public parks of
Haussman’s Paris became models from which every growing metropolis
of the continent took pattern.’72 If the Buildings Act were not repealed,
London’s private slaughter-houses would be closed and a large suburban
abattoir (or abattoirs) would be urgently required.73
The butchers had lost their struggle tomaintain Smithﬁeld as a live cattle
marketwhen itwas closed in 1855. TheCity had required that its slaughter-
houses be registered and subject to inspection by city commissioners
of sewers in 1848,74 while the Smithﬁeld Market Removal Act of 1851
in the metropolis (5.0%) were situated further than 50 feet from a dwelling house. LCC
PublicHealthCommittee’, report, LondonCounty CouncilMinutes of Proceedings (Jan.–Apr.),
18 Mar. 1902, 454.
70 PP 1873 X House of Commons Select Committee on Noxious Businesses, iii; C. Otter,
‘Cleansing and clarifying: technology and perception in nineteenth-century London’,
Journal of British Studies, 43 (2004), 51.
71 The term ‘noxious business’ included slaughter-houses among all the other offensive
trades speciﬁed as blood-boilers, bone-boilers, fellmongers, soap-boilers, tallow-melters
and tripe-boilers. However, slaughter-houses were the noxious business commonly found
in London. See PP 1873 X House of Commons Select Committee on Noxious Businesses,
evidence of James W. Crouch, q. 82.
72 S. Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History (Oxford,
1948), 210.
73 Large integrated Chicago-style meat-packing plants, owned and operated by limited
liability corporations, was an alternative model but this was scarcely considered in
nineteenth-century London.
74 City of London, Rules and Regulations for Slaughterhouses, Commissioners of Sewers
(London, 1852).
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required the licensing of slaughter-houseswithin themetropolis,75 thus the
momentum seemed to lie with the slaughter-house reformers.76 However,
the retail butchers rallied to their cause and arguedpersuasively for private
slaughter-houses on technical, economic and sanitary grounds. Chilled
storage and transportation facilities were not yet technically feasible so
supplying meat from peripheral localities was risky. According to the
London Butchers’ Trade Society, ‘there would be in London, many days in
the hot weather when, if a butcher had not got his live animals, and his
private slaughter-house, there would be practically no meat in London’.77
The slaughter-house functioned as both the butcher craftsman’s workshop
and as a live meat warehouse. Cattle could be held in a slaughter-house
stable for up to ﬁve days, to be killed and cut up as required by consumers,
protected from spoilage by their vitality. According to one butcher, ‘if I buy
live meat I can manage it just as I like, and introduce it to my shops just as
the trade requires’.78
Small private slaughter-houseswere therefore a prerequisite tomaintain
competition and keep the large-scale meat-packing monopolists at bay.
Large public abattoirs would drive private butchers out of the market,
permitting wholesalers and dealers to increase their share of meat sales
and creating the risk of an oligopoly in London’s meat market. The
malnourished working classes tended to purchase their offal and organ
meats from nearby butcher shops. Indeed customers actually waited for
fresh warm offal while slaughter was in progress in local neighbourhood
slaughter-houses.79
A central public abattoir would concentrate the ‘evils of slaughter’
and animal cruelty in one dense area, posing a monolithic health and
sanitation hazard instead of small-scale livestock slaughter dispersed
throughout the metropolitan area.80 In any case, the butchers argued
that ‘the improvements effected under the licensing system had rendered
slaughter-houses innocuous’, evincing some pride in maintaining their
shops in a clean and sanitary condition and denying claims that their
slaughter-houses were unsanitary nuisances.81 Thus the Committee on
Noxious Businesses recommended repeal of the offending clauses in the
Buildings Act, giving London’s private slaughter-houses a reprieve and
eliminating any pressing reason for London to build public abattoirs
following the Parisian model.
75 J.B. Sanderson, Report of Metropolitan Association London Society of Medical Ofﬁcers of Health
(London, 1856).
76 Dodd, Food of London, 257, 259.
77 PP 1873 XHouse of Commons Select Committee onNoxious Businesses, evidence of James
W. Crouch, q. 108.
78 Ibid., evidence of Mr Short, q. 339; similarly the butchers of Leeds kept a few cattle on
hand to be killed when themeat supply in their shops ran low, see Grady, ‘Cattle andmeat
trades’, 148.
79 PP 1873 X House of Commons Select Committee on Noxious Businesses, 25.
80 Ibid., 41; evidence of T.W. Keates, q. 639.
81 Dudﬁeld, ‘Private slaughter-houses’, 3.
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Ill. 4: A butcher and his three assistants surround a poleaxed steer just
before making the ﬁrst cut to bleed the animal. London’s private
slaughter-houses were typically small, dark and had limited
carcase-handling equipment, in contrast to La Villette. The heads of two
small boys are just visible peeking in the doorway, a practice abhorred
by British humanitarians who believed that slaughter had a brutalizing
inﬂuence on women and children.
Source: C. Cash, Our Slaughter-House System: A Plea for Reform (London,
1907), 19. Reproduced by kind permission of the Trustees of the National
Library of Scotland.
While the butchers were given a reprieve, it came at a price. The
Slaughterhouses &c. (Metropolis) Act, 1874, gave the LCC power to make
by-laws regulating the slaughter process, the structure of slaughter-houses
and the procedures to be followed for the approval of new slaughter-
houses. This enforced the improvement of the most poorly equipped
slaughter-houses, speciﬁed procedures to contain slaughter-house waste,
and required it to be removed within 24 hours of slaughter.82
Tuberculosis, meat inspection and the public abattoir
movement in the LCC
Unlike many other contagious animal diseases which posed a threat to
British livestock producers, TB was a zoonosis that could spread from
82 LCC, ‘Bye-laws for slaughterhouses in the County of London’ (1874), excerpted in A.W.
Blyth, A Manual of Public Health (London, 1890), 265–8.
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animals to humans by several different paths of infection.83 Preventing
the transmission of TB by meat became the principal justiﬁcation for meat
inspection. By the time of the ﬁrst royal commission on TB in 1895, it was
believed that bovine TB posed a threat to humans. But the level of risk and
the procedures to follow when TB was detected were controversial.84
Prompted by the lack of uniformity in the degree of TB that inspectors
would tolerate before carcases were seized and condemned, the second
royal commission investigated inspection procedures and slaughter-house
administration.85 The variation in the diligence and stringency of meat
inspection led to a ‘regulatory paradox’ i.e. when there are two inspection
standards, the more rigorously one plant (or jurisdiction) is regulated, the
lower will be the overall meat quality.86 Confronted by a strictly inspected
abattoir, livestock producers would simply divert poorer quality animals
to less scrupulous slaughter-houses in proportion to the rigour applied
at more stringently inspected plants. Belfast’s public abattoir provides a
case in point. The city was growing but the volume of meat handled in
the abattoir was declining. To avoid inspection and the risk that their
carcases would be condemned, cattle showing any signs of emaciation
were diverted to country slaughter-houses. With all the tell-tale organs
and obviously tubercular tissues removed, the carcases were then brought
into the city for sale with no indication that the meat might have come
from a diseased animal. ‘Butchers will seek relief from inspection which
they consider is unduly strict by using private slaughter-houses where
inspection is more lenient, or, as in most cases, wanting altogether.’87
Municipalized meat inspection was inconsistent and often ineffective.
In the 1890s, the Deptford abattoir was slaughtering some 2,700 cattle each
week but staff shortages meant there was no effective inspection until the
meat arrived at London Central Markets, but with all organs removed,
there was no prima facie evidence of disease. Meat consigned to other
marketswas practically uninspected.88 In any case, therewas no consensus
about the degree of bovine TB that could be tolerated by simply excising
the affected tissues and when the infection was so generalized that it was
necessary to condemn the entire carcase. Given the risk and judgement
83 A. Hardy, ‘Animals, disease and man’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 46 (2003), 202.
84 K.Waddington, ‘“Unﬁt for human consumption”: tuberculosis and the problemof infected
meat in late Victorian Britain’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 77 (2003), 650–8; K.
Waddington, ‘The science of cows: tuberculosis, research and the state in the United
Kingdom, 1890–1914’, History of Science, 39 (2001), 362–3.
85 Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 134.
86 I. MacLachlan, Kill and Chill: Restructuring Canada’s Beef Commodity Chain (Toronto, 2001),
130–1.
87 PP 1898 XLIX Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the
Administrative Procedures for Controlling Danger to Man through the Use as Food of
the Meat and Milk of Tuberculous Animals, 8. For examples of the evasive tactics used by
butchers see Eyler, Sir Arthur Newsholme, 67–8, and Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 55.
88 PP 1898 XLIX Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the
Administrative Procedures for Controlling Danger to Man through the Use as Food of
the Meat and Milk of Tuberculous Animals, 8.
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involved, the qualiﬁcations and training required of meat inspectors was
also an issue. According to TheMeat Trades Journal, ‘As long as the Sanitary
Institute turns tram conductors and plumbers into meat inspectors at so
much per head, the administration of the law will be weak, incompetent
and harassing.’89
Inspection standards varied considerably from one local authority
to another. For example, Scottish inspectors in the public abattoirs of
Glasgow, Edinburgh, Paisley and Greenock tended to condemn the entire
carcase while the same level of tubercular infection would be handled
by condemning only the affected parts in the English public abattoirs of
Leeds, Liverpool or Birmingham.90 The commissioners concluded, ‘Chaos
is the only word to express the absence of system in the inspection and
seizure of tuberculous meat, and it has, in our opinion, become necessary
that regulations should be formulated for the guidance of those who are
concerned in dealing with this subject.’91
The royal commission advocated compulsory meat inspection on a
uniform basis in a system of public slaughter-houses, recognizing that
if private slaughter was allowed to persist, the sickest animals would be
diverted away from inspected public facilities.
Believing, as we do, that the use of public slaughter-houses in populous places
to the exclusion of private ones, is a necessary preliminary to a uniform and
equitable system of meat inspection, we desire to point out that we consider that
power should be given to every local authority expending money in providing
a public slaughter-house, to close, if they think ﬁt, all or any of the registered
slaughter-houses in the district.92
These recommendations provided reformers with authoritative support
for the cause of public abattoirs. But they also appeared unjustiﬁed, for
by then it had been acknowledged that the risk of meat from tuberculous
carcases had been over-estimated and the hazard to human consumers
was low. The commission correctly believed that the danger from raw
milk was much greater than meat and that this was the chief source of
89 Editorial, The Meat Trades Journal, 592 (31 Aug. 1899), 416; in Hackney parish, for example,
meat inspection duties were performed by two plumbers, one carpenter, one compositor,
one bricklayer, one ﬂorist, one builder, one surveyor and one stonemason, PP 1898
XLIX Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Administrative
Procedures for Controlling Danger to Man through the Use as Food of the Meat and Milk
of TuberculousAnimals inReports fromCommissioners, Inspectors, andOthers, 7; for a list
of meat inspectors showing their prior vocation, see ‘Inspectors of Meat!’, The Meat Trades
Journal, 414 (2Apr. 1896), 972. One half of themeat inspectors inmetropolitan Londonwere
drawn from construction trades (chieﬂy carpenters andplumbers) and clerical occupations
while only one was a butcher. In the City of London all four meat inspectors were former
butchers suggesting some residual inﬂuence of the Butchers’ Company.
90 Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 89; Waddington, ‘“Unﬁt for human consumption”’, 649.
91 PP 1898 XLIX Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the
Administrative Procedures for Controlling Danger to Man through the Use as Food of
the Meat and Milk of Tuberculous Animals, 8.
92 Ibid., 10.
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Figure 1: Licensed slaughter-houses in metropolitan London
Source: LCC Sanitary and Special Purposes Committee, report, London
County Council Minutes of Proceedings (various years).
human infection by bovine TB.93 The validity and growing acceptance
of this concession made it difﬁcult to overcome the objections by private
butchers.
Before there was time for the commission’s recommendations to be
digested, an unexpected assertion by Robert Koch in 1901 challenged the
new orthodoxy that human and bovine TB were the same and questioned
the effectiveness of taking any measures against bovine TB. This stunning
claim set back meat inspection and milk pasteurization reforms for over
a decade and triggered a third royal commission on TB which dragged
on into the twentieth century, deﬂecting attention away from the public
abattoir question.94
With the TB question on hold, public abattoir advocacy shifted from
parliament to the public health department of the LCC. There had been
vast changes in the urban meat market since the House of Commons
Select Committee on Noxious Businesses had done its work in 1873. The
number of private slaughter-houses had declined from 1,500 in 1873 to
455 by 1897 (Figure 1). The decline in small-scale slaughter was driven
by two factors. First animal disease regulations to curb the spread of
pleuropneumonia in the British herd had required the diversion of all
imported cattle to foreign animal wharves for slaughter within ten days
of debarkation. In the case of London, virtually all foreign cattle had to
be intercepted at the Deptford abattoir. Second, imports of chilled and
frozen beef grew rapidly from 1875 to 1895 which substituted for the
93 Ibid., 12; Waddington, ‘“Unﬁt for human consumption”’, 638.
94 Waddington, ‘The science of cows’, 362–3.
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slaughter of imported cattle. And third, an increasing proportion of the
domestic beef consumed in Londonwas country-killed and shipped direct
to London Central Markets.95 Notwithstanding local sources of aged cows
from London’s dairies,96 town-killed beef dropped from 47 per cent of
the meat supply in 1875 to 19 per cent in 1895.97 This transformation in
London’s meat supply led George Dodd to comment, ‘the question of
public versus private slaughter-houses, which is at present the subject of
heated discussion in London, may perhaps be virtually solved by losing
most of its practical importance’.98 By 1898, eachof London’s 450 slaughter-
houses were killing an average of only two cattle per week.99 While the
stakes may have seemed small by the turn of the century, the principle of
private slaughter-houses in the LCC region remained contentious.
Dr Shirley Murphy,100 medical ofﬁcer of health (MOH) for the LCC,
argued that past objections to the closure of private slaughter-houses were
no longer valid and that the conclusions of the second royal commission
on bovine TB justiﬁed reconsideration of the meat inspection question.
Retail meat vendors in the greater London region had only one source of
inspected meat, the London Central Markets, which was inspected by city
ofﬁcers but of course, there could be no ante-mortem inspection. Three other
sources of meat in the vicinity were not systematically inspected: Deptford
public abattoir, the private slaughter-houses at the Islington Metropolitan
Cattle Market, and other private slaughter-houses in the Administrative
County of London. Retail butchers could also purchase dead meat direct
from farmers or fromprivate slaughter-houses outside the LCC areawhich
were not subject to any inspection whatsoever.101
Murphy declared, ‘there is no doubt that London now receives diseased
meat sent up from all parts of the country’, justifying the principle that
no meat should be sold without ﬁrst having been inspected. Inspection of
dispersed retail meat shops was a practical impossibility thus nothing but
centralized slaughter with inspection stations for all dead meat entering
95 Dodd, Food of London, 480; Perren, Meat Trade in Britain, 104–5; Rixson, History of Meat,
318–21.
96 As long as milk production remained an urban activity, spent dairy cows would provide
an intra-urban source of slaughter cattle, Dodd, Food of London, 218–19.
97 Agricultural returns of Great Britain reprinted in LCC, Public Health Department
‘Slaughterhouses report by the medical ofﬁcer of health’, 12 Jul. 1897, in Annual Report of
the Medical Ofﬁcer of Health as to the Provision of Public Slaughterhouses in the Administrative
County of London (1898), Appendix 2.
98 Dodd, Food of London, 480.
99 In 1897, 450 private slaughter-houses killed an average of 900 beasts in winter and 800 in
summer hence an average of two cattle per week, LCC, London County Council Minutes of
Proceedings (Jul.–Dec.), 11 Oct. 1898.
100 Dr Shirley Murphy, medical ofﬁcer of health for London County, was also a member of
the second royal commission on TB, see PP 1898 XLIX, Report of the Royal Commission
Appointed to Inquire into the Administrative Procedures for Controlling Danger to Man
through the Use as Food of the Meat and Milk of Tuberculous Animals.
101 LCC, PublicHealthDepartment, ‘Slaughterhouses report by themedical ofﬁcer of health’,
12 Jul. 1897, in Annual Report of the Medical Ofﬁcer of Health as to the Provision of Public
Slaughterhouses in the Administrative County of London (1898), Appendix 2, 3.
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the city would safeguard public health.With these considerations inmind,
Murphy proposed a system of six public abattoirs for the Administrative
County of London, three to the south of the Thames and three to the
north.102 The facilities would have railway connections to the major cattle
markets outside of London, aswell as to the existing IslingtonMetropolitan
Cattle Market. The six abattoirs would be located in suburban areas near
the urban margin to provide a source of inspected meat no further than
six miles from any butcher shop in the metropolitan region. Once the
public abattoirs were in full operation, there would no longer be any
need for private slaughter-houses in the London region.103 The MOH’s
report was submitted to the LCC on 14 July 1897 but consideration was
repeatedly delayed, referred to various committees and postponed so that
his resolution did not actually come before council until 31 January 1899:
As a ﬁrst step towards ensuring the proper inspection of meat, private slaughter-
houses should cease to exist in London, and that butchers should in substitution
be afforded such facilities as are necessary for the killing of animals in public
slaughter-houses to be erected by the council.104
The lengthy ﬁlibuster gave the butchers ample time to prepare their
defence. The resolution was promptly amended to not come into effect
until after an efﬁcient system to inspect milk had been devised and the
council then resolved to carry on to the next item of business. Dr Shirley
Murphy’s innovative plan for six suburban public abattoirs found little
support and powerful opposition. As Anne Hardy has argued, ‘the urban
meat trade and the wider national agricultural system were too powerful
for any minority medical opinion to achieve effective inﬂuence’.105
Butcher trades triumphant
TheNational Federation ofMeat Traders’ Associations (NFMTA) had been
formed in 1888, just as the public abattoir was becoming a potent threat
to butchers’ interests.106 It was often a reactive organization, throwing its
considerable energies and political inﬂuence into defending the right of
butchers to operate private slaughter-houses and opposing all initiatives
to introduce meat inspection. The federation supported a pragmatic ethic
of independent craftsmanship and took exception to meddling by local
authorities and reformers.
102 These were to be located at Herne Hill, Greenwich and Wandsworth on the south side of
the Thames and Willesden, Hackney Marshes and Islington to the north. See LCC, ‘Map
showing the suggested sites for proposed public slaughterhouses in London’ (1896).
103 LCC, PublicHealthDepartment, ‘Slaughterhouses report by themedical ofﬁcer of health’,
12 Jul. 1897, in Annual Report of the Medical Ofﬁcer of Health as to the Provision of Public
Slaughterhouses in the Administrative County of London (1898), Appendix 2, 3.
104 LCC, London County Council Minutes of Proceedings (Jul.–Dec. 1897), 1109.
105 Hardy, ‘Pioneers in the Victorian provinces’, 377.
106 J. Jackson, Ofﬁcial History of the National Federation of Meat Traders’ Associations (Plymouth,
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250 Urban History
The key to the federation’s success in opposing public abattoir
initiatives in the 1890s was its active role in political affairs. Members
were encouraged to attend public meetings organized by humanitarians
and vegetarians, to oppose reformers and to defend their craft from
unﬂattering portrayals.107 Butchers and meat traders were exhorted to
run for municipal ofﬁce and to secure appointments on the Sanitary or
Markets Committees.108 The federation provided tips to assist butcher
politicians in monitoring efforts to create public abattoirs and to detect
Trojan horse legislation in which clauses to close private slaughter-houses
might be buried under vague rubrics such as ‘Town Improvements’ or
‘Omnibus’ bills.109 The motives for such initiatives might have been
‘sanitorily philanthropic’ but their impact would have been ‘absolutely
murderous in their attacks upon private slaughter-houses’.110
Publication of the MOH’s report in 1898 was a clear challenge to
private slaughter-houses in the LCC area and had serious implications
for the remainder of England. Thus a local issue confronting the London
Butchers’ Trade Association became a national issue for the NFMTA.
As self-interested businessmen, the butchers were motivated to retain
ownership of their private slaughter-houses and to control the entire
carcase dressing and retail meat fabrication process. The butchers did
not relish sending their staff across the city to a public abattoir to secure
various cuts of meat whenever they were needed with the possibility
that workers might dawdle or that valuable carcase material such as fat
or offal might be pilfered along the way. Even the moribund Butchers’
Company petitioned the LCC in favour of private slaughter, arguing
that the highest quality English and ‘Scotch’ cattle could only maintain
their premiummarket position if they were carefully tended, fattened and
transported to small but efﬁcient private slaughter-houses where the beef
would be more carefully handled.111 The NFMTA strategy was to build a
coalition of support for private slaughter, thus its opposition to theMOH’s
initiativewas calculated to gain support fromboth livestock producers and
consumers.
From the producer’s point of view, public abattoirs would encourage
the consumption of foreign meat. The more inconvenient it became to
slaughter British livestock, the more likely were butchers to turn to
imported sources for meat. ‘We shall quickly be depending on imported
meat formore thanhalf our supply; anddaybydaybemore andmore at the
107 Editorial, The Meat Trades Journal, 351 (17 Jan. 1895), 634.
108 Editorial, TheMeat Trades Journal, 600 (26 Oct. 1899), 608; Editorial, TheMeat Trades Journal,
602 (9 Nov. 1899), 656; Editorial, The Meat Trades Journal, 603 (16 Nov. 1899), 680.
109 ‘Annual conference at Liverpool’, The Meat Trades Journal, 508 (20 Jan. 1898), 791; this
argument is also made with respect to humane cattle slaughter in I. MacLachlan, ‘Coup
de graˆce: humane cattle slaughter in nineteenth-century Britain’, Food and History, 3 (2)
(2006), 168–70.
110 Editorial, The Meat Trades Journal, 454 (7 Jan. 1897), 726.
111 Jones, Butchers of London, 98.
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mercy of the American monopolist.’112 From a consumer vantage point, it
was argued that without private slaughter-houses as a check, monopolies
would develop at home, both in the meat slaughtered in the abattoir and
among the dealers selling country-killed livestock in dead meat markets.
The experience of oligopoly control ofmeat and cattlemarkets in Paris and
Chicago and the formation of ‘rings’ in New York to keep the price of meat
artiﬁcially high exempliﬁed what could occur in London. The butchers
were fond of arguing that ‘private slaughter-houses were a great boon
to the poor’ whose diet was especially rich in organ meats and private
slaughter-houses could be relied upon to supply the cheapest, freshest
and highest quality offal.113 A bullock provided sufﬁcient offal to feed 40
peoplewhile a sheep could feed about eightwith liver, heart, tripe, kidneys
and other ‘fancy meats’.114
The butchers were aided by the fact that the case for public abattoirs was
not especially strong. With respect to sanitation and zoonoses, the MOH
had no smoking gun; therewas no direct evidence that a private slaughter-
house had ever caused the spread of disease nor was there evidence of
people having been injured or infected by living in the vicinity of a private
slaughter-house. The 1898 royal commission on TBhad recently concluded
that unpasteurized milk posed a much greater hazard than meat from
tubercular animals. The federation argued, ‘one of the most extraordinary
features of the present agitation is the fact that the evidence is piled up
against the dairy, but the sentence is being passed on to the slaughter-
house’.115
The federation gathered a number of inﬂuential interest groups to
oppose the proposed abolition of the slaughter-houses. At a meeting of
the LCC Public Health Committee, the butcher interests were represented
by the Meat Trades Section of the London Chamber of Commerce,
the Metropolitan Cattle and Sheep Trades Association, Central Meat
and Poultry Markets’ Association, the London Butchers’ Trade Society
and the umbrella NFMTA.116 Motivated by the belief that the public
abattoir proposal would strengthen the position of imported meat to
the detriment of domestic livestock producers, rural and agricultural
interests aligned with the butchers and a number of regional agricultural
organizations passed resolutions supporting private slaughter-houses.117
112 ‘Private slaughterhouses v. Public Abattoirs II’, TheMeat Trades Journal, 592 (31Aug. 1899),
418.
113 ‘Public opinion of slaughterhouses’, The Meat Trades Journal, 96 (1 Mar. 1890), 6; ‘Private
slaughterhouses v. Public abattoirs II’, The Meat Trades Journal, 592 (31 Aug. 1899), 418.
114 Corporation of London, Opening of New Public Slaughterhouses and Chill Rooms
(London 1910), 10.
115 ‘Private slaughterhouses v. public abattoirs’, The Meat Trades Journal, 591 (24 Aug. 1899),
398.
116 ‘Deputation to L.C.C. Public Health Committee’, The Meat Trades Journal, 550 (10 Nov.
1898), 538.
117 Agricultural groups which passed resolutions in favour of the retention of
private slaughter-houses included Taunton Farmers’ Club, Lincolnshire Chamber of
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The federation viewed this agro-industrial/rural–urban alliance of
interests with satisfaction:
The London County Council have, however, more than the butcher to reckon
with – they have the breeders and feeders of the United Kingdom yet to face. We
have all along maintained that this was more than a mere slaughter-house closing
question, and we are glad to note that the powerful inﬂuence of the agricultural
press is now ranged side by side with us in the ﬁght.118
To consolidate urban support for their cause, the London Butchers’
Trade Society sent deputations throughout the LCC region and secured
resolutions from 20 parish vestries supporting the retention of private
slaughter-houses.119
Independent of the interest groups solicited by butchers was a strong
representation by the residents of suburban Herne Hill, one of the
six locations identiﬁed for a public abattoir. Residents complained
that a public abattoir would be distasteful, lower the character of the
district, depreciate the value of the houses and spoil a restful residential
neighbourhood. A sarcastic response to a survey by the South London
Chronicle gives a vivid impression about prevailing attitudes towards an
industrial development proposed for a suburban area in 1899. ‘Why not
suggest Trafalgar-square for one grand central place of this sort? It would
have several advantages: be near Spring-gardens, cause more injury to
property, interfere more with trafﬁc, the National Gallery and a few large
hotels might be done awaywith to increase the site.’120 This example of the
NIMBY syndrome, in which a middle-class suburb opposes an adjacent
development due to its negative externalities, shows that antagonistic
neighbourhood-based responses to planned municipal initiatives has a
long pedigree.121
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Conclusion
For over 70 years slaughter-house reformers argued for the abolition
of private slaughter-houses in favour of a centralized system of public
abattoirs. Public abattoirs were advocated to solve urban congestion
and pedestrian hazards in Smithﬁeld Market and the public health
movement put the slaughter-house nuisance on London’s policy agenda.
The Buildings Act served 30 years’ notice that slaughter-houses would
be abolished but at the last minute it was turned aside. The second
royal commission on TB advocated public abattoirs as the only means to
establishuniversalmeat inspection. LCC’sMOHwasno less determined to
prohibit private livestock slaughter within the London County region and
introduce a system of six publicly inspected municipal abattoirs. But these
reform initiatives were successfully opposed due to the determination,
political organization and inﬂuence of the butcher trades.
Victorian laissez-faire sentiments were unsuited to an article of
consumption which had to be bought in large quantities (livestock on the
hoof), retailed in household-sized portions and, due to its perishability,
both transactions had to take place within a matter of hours.122 This caveat
to laissez-faire philosophywas a variant on themore general theme of John
Stuart Mill’s (1859) inOn Libertywhich conceded exceptions to the general
principles of liberalism. Liberal reformers and pamphleteers favoured the
regulation of market activities where there were health concerns giving
rise to a mixed economy in which dirigiste government policies regulated
sectors which were resolutely opposed to state intervention.
But the butchers rallied to maintain their status as free traders and they
were as politically adept, as resentful of public authority and as obstinate
in their opposition to public abattoirs in the provinces as they were in
London.123 Despite the abolition of private slaughter-houses in the City
of London in 1927,124 the De La Warr Commission counted no fewer than
16,000 small private slaughter-houses dispersed throughout England and
Wales in 1933, showing the persistence of independent butchers and their
desire tomaintain control over slaughter.With an average slaughter-house
kill of 12 headperweek (2 cattle, 6.5 sheep and 3.5 pigs), thousands of small
independent butchers preserved a remarkable level of craft control over
the British meat supply. This came at a price: British livestock slaughtering
practices fell far short of best foreign practice, full veterinary inspection
was not achieved until 1966.125 The persistence in Britain of small-scale
slaughter-houses that were owned and controlled by individual retail
122 Grantham, A Treatise, 29–30.
123 Eyler, Sir Arthur Newsholme, 64–72.
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butchers stood in marked contrast to the industrial model of large-scale
meat packing that developed in North America.126
Many of the proposals for public abattoirs originated with national
initiatives such as the second royal commission on TB in 1898. But
animal slaughter was never a candidate for nationalization. Slaughter-
house reform was always couched in terms of a municipalized system
of livestock slaughter under the jurisdiction of local government. And
while some enabling legislationwasparliamentary, themost bitter political
battles were fought at the local authority level. However, the butchers and
allied trades used their political organization and inﬂuencewith such effect
that private slaughter-houses persisted alongside municipal abattoirs in
a mixed urban economy. Thus London entered the twentieth century as
it had entered the nineteenth, with a meat supply that was only partially
inspected and with hundreds of small-scale slaughter-houses dispersed
throughout the metropolitan region.
126 Economic Advisory Council, Committee on the Slaughtering of Livestock, Earl De La Warr,
chairman (London, 1933), 12–14, 49.
